Winning and losing: Effects on impulsive action by Verbruggen, Frederick et al.





Natalia S. Lawrence and Ian P. L. McLaren
University of Exeter
In the present study, we examined the effect of wins and losses on impulsive action in gambling
(Experiments 1–3) and nongambling tasks (Experiments 4–5). In each experiment, subjects performed a
simple task in which they had to win points. On each trial, they had to choose between a gamble and a
nongamble. The gamble was always associated with a higher amount but a lower probability of winning
than the nongamble. After subjects indicated their choice (i.e., gamble or not), feedback was presented.
They had to press a key to start the next trial. Experiments 1–3 showed that, compared to the
nongambling baseline, subjects were faster to initiate the next trial after a gambled loss, indicating that
losses can induce impulsive actions. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects alternated between the gambling
task and a neutral decision-making task in which they could not win or lose points. Subjects were faster
in the neutral decision-making task if they had just lost in the gambling task, suggesting that losses have
a general effect on action. Our results challenge the dominant idea that humans become more cautious
after suboptimal outcomes. Instead, they indicate that losses in the context of potential rewards are
emotional events that increase impulsivity.
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Scientists often attribute adaptive and goal-directed human be-
havior to a cognitive control system that organizes, monitors, and
alters the settings of lower-level cognitive processes. This allows
people to suppress or replace impulsive, habitual, or inappropriate
actions. For example, cognitive control is required to quickly
suppress prepotent actions when a stop or no-go signal is presented
(Miyake et al., 2000; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Sega-
lowitz, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). Cognitive
control is also required for responding with restraint (without
completely suppressing all ongoing responses). For example, peo-
ple slow down and respond more cautiously when they expect a
stop signal to occur (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b; for reviews,
see, e.g., Aron, 2011; Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012). This slowing can
be attributed to top-down control adjustments in attentional set-
tings to enhance detection of the stop signal, and adjustments in
response or motor settings to prevent premature responses (e.g.,
Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016). Similarly, the
cognitive control system can attenuate motor activation in situa-
tions in which accurate responses are required (e.g., Forstmann et
al., 2008) or when there is uncertainty about which action has to be
selected (e.g., Frank, 2006).
Many psychological theories assume that the cognitive control
system also alters the settings of lower-level systems when people
make an error or when outcomes are otherwise less desirable than
anticipated (Egner, 2008; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham,
2014; Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014). For example,
people often slow down after they make an error (“posterror
slowing”; Laming, 1968; Rabbitt & Phillips, 1967; Rabbitt &
Rodgers, 1977). Such sequential effects have been observed in a
variety of tasks, and are usually attributed to the cognitive control
system: It monitors for errors (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Brown
& Braver, 2005; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007), the occurrence
of conflict between choice options (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick,
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Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Yeung, Botvinick, &
Cohen, 2004), or more generally, events that are worse than
expected (Botvinick, 2007; Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & Simons,
2006; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd, Schurger, & Cohen, 2004).
When the control system detects such events, it adjusts the param-
eters of task-relevant processing pathways. These adjustments
usually increase response latencies (i.e., people become more
cautious) but can reduce the likelihood of further negative or
suboptimal outcomes on subsequent trials (e.g., Dutilh, Vandeker-
ckhove, et al., 2012; Purcell & Kiani, 2016).
The present study examined sequential effects of wins and
losses in a gambling task. Gambling is a recreational activity that
many people engage in (e.g., 73% of the U.K. adult population;
Wardle et al., 2011), but for a minority of people, it can turn into
pathological or problematic behavior, which may have serious
adverse personal and social consequences (Clark & Limbrick-
Oldfield, 2013; Potenza, 2014). Problem gambling has been asso-
ciated with impairments in cognitive control. For example, the
control system may be required to regulate risk taking by sup-
pressing superficially attractive but risky options (e.g., Billieux,
Gay, Rochat, & Van der Linden, 2010; Cohen & Lieberman, 2010;
Knoch et al., 2006; Trepel, Fox, & Poldrack, 2005; Verbruggen,
Adams, & Chambers, 2012). Cognitive control may also be re-
quired to adjust decision-making strategies after a loss or a sub-
optimal outcome, and failures to do so may contribute to the
development of problematic behaviors, including problem gam-
bling (Brown & Braver, 2008; Garavan & Stout, 2005; van Holst,
van den Brink, Veltman, & Goudriaan, 2010).
Cognitive control accounts predict decreased gambling after a
loss than after a win. However, people often gamble more after a
loss than after a win (Clark, 2010). Similar effects of negative
outcomes on choice behavior have been observed in a variety of
tasks and situations, including the stock market (e.g., Imas, 2014;
Smith, Levere, & Kurtzman, 2009). Many explanations have been
proposed for such sequential effects (for a short review, see Smith
et al., 2009). For example, according to prospect theory (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979), the subjective value of an option can be
influenced by immediately preceding gains and losses (Smith et
al., 2009). This could explain why people gamble more after a loss
than after a win, and attempt to recover previous losses.
Cognitive control accounts also predict slower responding (in-
creased response caution) after a loss than after a win. By contrast,
several gambling studies found that subjects were faster to initiate
the next gamble after a loss than after a win (Corr & Thompson,
2014; Delfabbro & Winefield, 1999; Dixon, MacLaren, Jarick,
Fugelsang, & Harrigan, 2013; Shao, Read, Behrens, & Rogers,
2013; but see also Brevers et al., 2015; Goudriaan, Oosterlaan, de
Beurs, & van den Brink, 2005). This finding indicates that negative
outcomes in a gambling task can lead to impulsive (fast emotion-
ally charged) actions, and challenges the dominant idea that hu-
mans become more cautious after suboptimal outcomes. However,
many gambling studies lack a proper baseline, so it is unclear if
shorter response latencies after a loss than after a win are due to
altered performance after a loss, altered performance after a win,
or some combination of the two. In other words, without a base-
line, we cannot be sure if the sequential effects of gambling are
inconsistent with the cognitive control accounts. Another compli-
cating factor is that the feedback after a win is usually different
from feedback after a loss. For example, wins are often associated
with extra sounds or additional visual stimuli (e.g., Delfabbro &
Winefield, 1999; Dixon et al., 2013). The present study will
control for these perceptual factors and explore if and how out-
comes in a gambling task influence initiation times on subsequent
trials.
Overview of the Experiments
In the present study, we examined how wins and losses influ-
ence impulsive action in both gambling (Experiments 1–3) and
alternating nongambling tasks (Experiments 4–5). Many judgment
and decision-making studies have examined how gains and losses
influence choice (see above). However, response latencies are
often ignored in the judgment and decision-making literature, even
though they can provide useful information about how people react
to positive and negative events. Our main aim was to address this
gap in the literature. Therefore, the present study focuses on
response latencies. We will provide a general overview of the
choice data after the final experiment, but an extensive overview of
the very rich and extensive judgment and decision-making litera-
ture is beyond the scope of this paper.
In Experiment 1, we piloted our gambling task (see Figure 1),
which is similar to tasks that have been used to measure the
neurocognitive correlates of decision-making under risk (e.g., De
Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Tymula et al., 2012),
and the influence of emotion and motivation on economic choices
(e.g., Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; Ernst et
al., 2004; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Wright, Morris,
Guitart-Masip, & Dolan, 2013). Subjects played a very simple
game in which they had to win points. Each trial started with the
presentation of an amount of points that was guaranteed if subjects
decided not to gamble. This was followed by the presentation of a
gamble, which was associated with a higher number of points, but
the probability of winning the gamble was lower than 100%. After
subjects indicated their choice (i.e., to gamble or not), we pre-
sented the outcome of the trial: After a gamble, feedback indicated
whether subjects had won points (“gambled win”) or not (“gam-
bled loss”); when subjects did not gamble, they kept the number of
points shown at the beginning of the trial (i.e., the guaranteed
amount associated with the nongamble option). The nongambling
trials are our baseline to determine whether gambled losses, gam-
bled wins, or both influenced action. Importantly, apart from the
(inevitable) differences in amount, there were no perceptual dif-
ferences in feedback between the various trial types (i.e., non-
gamble, gambled loss, and gambled win).
In Experiments 2a and 2b, we also acquired subjective ratings
on half of the trials to further assess motivation and subjective
beliefs (Clark et al., 2013). In Experiments 3a and 3b, we manip-
ulated the background of the screen to explore the stimulus- or
context-specificity of the sequential effects of losses and wins.
Finally, Experiments 4 and 5 examined the effect of gambling on
response latencies in a subsequent “neutral” decision-making task
in which subjects could not win or lose points.
We measured the initiation time of the next trial (start reaction
time [RT]) in each experiment. In other words, we examined how
quickly subjects acted after a win or a loss. For completeness, we
present an overview of the choice data at the end of the manuscript.
To summarize the main findings of the choice analysis: In all
experiments, subjects gambled on approximately 50% of the trials
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(but there were large individual differences; see Supplementary
Materials). Importantly, they gambled less after a gambled win
than after a nongamble, and the probability of gambling was
highest after a gambled loss. These findings are consistent with
previous studies (see above), and indicate that choice can be
influenced by the outcome of the previous trial. The main question




Subjects. Twenty students (eight males; age: M  19.9 years,
SD  1.4) from the University of Exeter participated for monetary
compensation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the
gambling task (see below). Two subjects were replaced because
they rarely gambled in the task; consequently, there were not
enough trials (N  5) for the sequential analyses. The subject
exclusion criteria and target sample were determined before data
collection, based on another pilot study (N  20) in which we
found large effects of the outcome of a gamble on the start RT of
the next trial (Cohen’s dz between .7 and 1.2). All experiments of
the present study were approved by the local research ethics
committee at the School of Psychology, University of Exeter.
Written informed consent was obtained after the nature and pos-
sible consequences of the studies were explained.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiments were run on a 21.5-
in. iMac using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). We used a standard
QWERTY keyboard for response registration. On each trial, two
choice options were represented by pie charts (diameter: 5 cm)
containing a certain amount of points (see Figure 1). The first
option always represented an amount of points that was guaranteed
if subjects decided not to gamble. The second option always
represented the gamble. If selected, subjects could risk the guar-
anteed amount to win a higher amount of points; however, the
probability of winning the higher amount was always less than
100%. The exact probability of winning was indicated by the areas
of the pie chart. A green (RGB: 0-127-0) area represented the
probability that subjects could win the amount shown in the pie
chart; a red (RGB: 127-0-0) area represented the probability that
they would get nothing. Thus, the larger the green area, the higher
the probability of winning. The red segment was always on the left
within the “gamble” pie (see Figure 1). The options were presented
against a white background (RGB: 255-255-255). The amounts
appeared in the center of the green area of the pie chart (font: Arial;
font size: 30 point; font color: white).
The amounts and the gambles were randomized across trials: the
amount associated with the nongamble (i.e., the guaranteed amount)
varied between 20 and 50 (i.e., 20, 30, 40, 50), and the amount
Figure 1. An example of a trial in the gambling task. Each trial commenced with a start message. Then we
presented two options successively for 1 s. The first option always represented a guaranteed amount of points
that was awarded when subjects did not gamble. The second option always represented a higher amount, but
here, the probability of winning was less than 100% (the gamble). The exact probability of winning was indicated
by the areas in the “pie chart.” The green area represented the probability that subjects could win the amount
shown in the chart, and the red area represented the probability that they would get nothing. Then the options
were presented together and subjects indicated whether they wanted to gamble or not by pressing the
corresponding arrow key (there was no time limit). After subjects indicated their choice, feedback was presented
for 1 s—in this example, the subject elected (successfully) to risk a certain 30 points on a 50:50 gamble to win
60 points (see Method section under Experiment 1 for further details). See the online article for the color version
of this figure.
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associated with the gamble was 1.5, 2, 3, or 4 times higher than the
guaranteed amount. This resulted in 16 possible combinations (see
Appendix A). The probability of winning the gamble varied be-
tween .25 and .66 (i.e., .25, .33, .50, .66), and was adjusted to keep
the expected value of the gamble and the nongamble the same
(e.g., when the guaranteed amount for the nongamble was 50, and
the gamble was 200, then the probability of winning the gamble
was .25; 50  .25  200; see Appendix A).
Procedure. Figure 1 gives an overview of the trial structure.
Each trial commenced with the message “Press a key to start the
next trial.” After subjects had pressed any key of the keyboard and
500 ms had elapsed since the presentation of the message,1 the
guaranteed amount associated with the nongamble was presented
in a green pie chart. Then the gamble was presented in a red-and-
green pie chart. Both pie charts were presented in the center of the
screen for 1 s. After they had been presented separately, subjects
saw them again together (one on the left and one on the right of the
screen; distance between the two options: 5 cm). At this point, they
had to decide whether they wanted to gamble or not by pressing
the left- or right-arrow key of the keyboard for the left or right
option, respectively (see Figure 1). At the beginning of the exper-
iment, subjects were informed that they were guaranteed to earn
points if they did not gamble. There was no time out during the
choice phase. Left and right arrows were presented below the
options to remind subjects that they could respond only at this
stage, and they were told at the beginning of the experiment that
they could use the index and middle finger of their right hand to
press the keys. The location of the nongamble and gamble options
(i.e., left or right of the center of the screen) was randomized
across trials.
After subjects selected an option, the computer showed the
outcome of their choice. If they had selected the gamble, the
computer indicated whether they had won the points indicated in
the pie chart (gambled win; e.g., “outcome  200 points”) or not
(gambled loss; “outcome  0 points”). To determine the outcome
of a gamble, the computer selected a random number between 0
and 1 on each trial, and subjects had won the gamble if the selected
number was smaller than pwin. If they had selected the nongam-
bling option, subjects always received the guaranteed amount
shown at the beginning of the trial (e.g., “outcome  50 points”).
Finally, an error message was presented if subjects pressed an
incorrect key (“Incorrect response. Use the left and right arrow
keys.”); they did not get any points on such trials. After 1 s, the
next trial started with the “Press a key to start the next trial” screen.
To ensure that there were enough trials for the sequential anal-
yses, the gambling task consisted of 256 trials. For most subjects,
the experiment lasted 20–30 min. Subjects were told that if they
wished to do so, they could take a short “minibreak” between
trials, as there were no fixed breaks after a set number of trials.
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Tymula et al., 2012), we
made choices consequential: At the end of the experiment, the
computer randomly selected the outcomes of 10 trials. The sum of
these was converted into real money: for every 100 points, subjects
got £1 extra. The maximum additional payout was £5 (range:
£0–5). Subjects were informed about the payoff structure at the
beginning of the experiment.
Analysis. All data processing and analyses were completed
using R (R Development Core Team, 2015). All raw data files and
R scripts used for the analyses are deposited on the Open Research
Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17260).
In the sequential analyses, we distinguished between trials that
followed a nongamble (our baseline), trials that followed a “gam-
bled” win, and trials that followed a “gambled” loss. For each trial
type, we calculated how quickly subjects started the next trial (start
RT). Due to the payoff manipulation (i.e., at the end of the
experiment, the computer randomly selected the outcome of 10
trials), points did not accumulate over the course of the experi-
ment. Therefore, we did not control for overall accumulation of
points in the analyses, but we show in Supplementary Materials
that the effect of trial outcome on start RT was similar in the first
and second half of the experiment. Because some subjects did not
gamble often, we could not explore whether a loss or win occurred
in a context of doing well or in a context of doing poorly (see, e.g.,
Mellers, 2000, p. 915).
We excluded trials on which start RT was above 5,000 ms or the
latency of the choice response (i.e., the left/right arrow response)
was above 2,500 ms, trials on which subjects pressed an incorrect
key, and trials that followed such incorrect trials. This resulted in
a data exclusion of 2.6%. The trial exclusion criteria were deter-
mined before data collection. The analyses focused on the effect of
the outcome of the previous trial; therefore, we also excluded the
first trial of the experiment. Note that follow-up tests revealed that
results did not change much when we used a stricter cut-off for
start RT (2,500 ms instead of 5,000 ms). Furthermore, the RT
pattern was very similar when median RTs were analyzed instead
of means.
Inferential statistics appear in Table 1. We performed paired t
tests to contrast the trial types, but we show an overview of the
corresponding univariate analyses in Appendix B. For the pairwise
comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure
(Lakens, 2013).
Results and Discussion
Start RTs were influenced by the outcome of the previous trial:
Subjects started the next trial sooner after a gambled loss (M 
485 ms; SD  146) than after a gambled win (M  573 ms; SD 
198) or a nongamble (M  669; SD  195); both ps  .01 (see
Table 1). The difference between trials following a gambled win
and trials following a nongamble was also statistically significant,
p  .01. Thus, compared to a nongambling baseline, gambling on
the previous trial generally shortened start RT. Engaging with
stimuli that are inconsistently associated with reward (i.e., the
gambling option) may temporarily boost dopamine and induce a
motivational “approach” state (Robinson, Anselme, Fischer, &
Berridge, 2014). Most importantly, this effect was largest after a
loss, suggesting that losing points can induce impulsive actions.
This finding appears inconsistent with the cognitive control ac-
count, which predicts that people should become more cautious
(i.e., less impulsive) after a gambled loss than after gambled win
or a nongamble. However, it is possible that subjects started the
next trial sooner after a loss than after a win because they believed
1 In future experiments, we plan to measure EEG when subjects are
performing the task. To avoid overlap between visual components associ-
ated with the different perceptual events, the minimum delay between the
start message and the presentation of the first option was 500 ms.
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their chances of winning had increased (i.e., the gamblers fallacy).
This account is not necessarily inconsistent with the cognitive
control account, as it assumes that behavior can be regulated by
expectancies about future events; this can happen even when these
expectancies or beliefs are incorrect. We explored this idea in
Experiment 2.
Experiments 2a and 2b
Experiment 1 indicates that the outcome of a gamble can influ-
ence start RT. In Experiment 2, we further explored the origins of
this effect. To examine the motivational consequences of gambling
and subjects’ beliefs about upcoming events, on half of the trials
we asked them to indicate whether they agreed with the following
two statements: “I was pleased with the outcome of the previous
trial” and “I think my chances of winning on the next trial have
increased” (for a similar procedure, see, e.g., Clark et al., 2013).
These statements were presented after the feedback stage (the
previous trial) but before the new choice options appeared (the
next trial). To allow a direct comparison with Experiment 1,
subjects had to press a key to continue the experiment after each
feedback screen.
Method
Subjects. Forty new students (Experiment 2a: N  20; Ex-
periment 2b: N  20; 6 males, age: M  19.6 years, SD  2.0)
from the University of Exeter participated for monetary compen-
sation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the gam-
bling task. One subject was replaced in Experiment 2b because
they rarely gambled in the task (see Experiment 1).
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analysis. These were
the same as in Experiment 1 except for the following: In both
experiments, responses were registered with a gaming mouse
(Razor Deathadder; http://www.razerzone.com/gaming-mice/
razer-deathadder). Each trial started with a message “Click to
continue.” The trial continued when the subject clicked one of the
mouse buttons. On half of the trials (no-rating trials), the gambling
task started immediately; on the other half (rating trials), subjects
had to rate two statements first. The first statement was always “I
was pleased with the outcome of the previous trial (X points)”
(X number of points the subject had won). The second statement
was always “I think my chances of winning on the next trial have
increased.” The statements appeared in the center of the screen
(font: Arial 24 point). Subjects indicated the extent to which they
agreed with the statements by clicking with the mouse on a visual
analog scale (10 cm) that appeared below the statement. The scale
ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much). The gambling task
started immediately after the second rating response. The order of
rating and no-rating trials was fully randomized at the beginning of
the experiment (i.e., it was not influenced by the subject’s choices
or outcomes of the gambles).
In Experiment 2a, we immediately presented the two choice
options together in the gambling task, and subjects could select one
of them by clicking with the mouse on the preferred option. A
preliminary analysis of this experiment showed that the effect of
gambling outcome on choice interacted with the rating manipula-
Table 1
Overview of Planned Comparisons to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on the Start RT
of the Gambling Task in Experiments 1–5
Experiment diff Lower CI Upper CI t p gav BF
Experiment 1
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 184 141 227 8.905 .001 1.057 4.15  105
Nongamble vs. gambled win 96 48 145 4.181 .001 .482 66.17
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 87 132 42 4.080 .001 .498 54.10
Experiment 2
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 67 42 92 5.376 .001 .482 4,913
Nongamble vs. gambled win 28 1 57 1.936 .060 .184 .92
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 39 68 9 2.662 .011 .265 3.69
Experiment 3
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 160 121 199 8.321 .001 .895 3.04  107
Nongamble vs. gambled win 49 1 97 2.080 .044 .231 1.18
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 111 170 52 3.819 .001 .529 60.15
Experiment 4
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 48 26 69 4.453 .001 .306 340.50
Nongamble vs. gambled win 33 56 10 2.952 .005 .205 7.02
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 81 111 51 5.517 .001 .522 7,459
Experiment 5
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 28 7 62 1.616 .114 .112 .56
Nongamble vs. gambled win 12 14 37 .938 .354 .048 .26
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 16 50 19 .930 .358 .065 .26
Note. RT  reaction time; diff  difference; CI  confidence interval; gav  Hedge’s average g; BF  Bayes
factor, which is an odds ratio: It is the probability of the data under one hypothesis relative to that under another.
Evidence categories for Bayes Factor: BF  .33  substantial evidence for Hypothesis (H)0; 1/3–1  anecdotal
evidence for H0; 1 no evidence; 1–3 anecdotal evidence for HA; 3–10 substantial evidence for HA; BF
10 strong to decisive evidence for HA. H0  no difference between the trial types; HA  a difference between
the trial types. We calculated the Bayes factors with the BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior (.707).
Experiment 1, df  19; Experiments 2–5, df  39.
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tion (see Supplementary Materials). To determine whether this was
due to the actual rating or to some stimulus-presentation artifact,
we ran a second version (Experiment 2b) in which we used the
presentation mode of Experiment 1 (i.e., the two options were first
presented successively for 1 s, and then they were presented
together). Initial analyses showed that Experiment did not interact
significantly with the effect of trial outcome. Therefore, we col-
lapsed the data of Experiments 2a and 2b.
For the analyses, we used the same trial exclusion criteria as
Experiment 1. This resulted in a data reduction of 11% in Exper-
iment 2a and 4% in Experiment 2b (because the options were
immediately presented together in Experiment 2a, choice latencies
were longer than the choice latencies in Experiments 1 and 2b).
For the ‘Ratings’ ANOVA, generalized eta squared is the reported
effect size measure.
Results and Discussion
Start RTs. Subjects executed the start response before the
statements were presented; therefore, we collapsed the data of
rating and no-rating trials for the start RT analysis. The start RT
data were consistent with Experiment 1: subjects started the next
trial sooner after a gambled loss (M  416 ms; SD  132) than
after a nongamble (M  483 ms; SD  142) or a gambled win
(M  455 ms; SD  158); both ps  .012 (see Table 1). The
difference between trials following a nongamble and trials follow-
ing a gambled win was marginally significant (two-tailed p  .06;
one-tailed: p  .03).
Ratings. The rating for the “pleased with outcome” statement
was influenced by the outcome of the previous trial, F(2, 78) 
213.5, p  .001, gen2  0.771. Subjects were more pleased with
the outcome of the previous trial after a gambled win (M  73,
SD 14) than after a nongamble (M 47; SD 14) or a gambled
loss (M  16; SD  11); all differences were statistically signif-
icant (ps  .001).
The rating for the “increased chances of winning” statement was
also influenced by the outcome of the previous trial, F(2, 78) 
15.9, p  .001, gen2  0.052. Subjects thought that their chances
of winning on the next trial had increased more after a gambled
win (M  39, SD  23) than after a nongamble (M  35, SD 
21) or a gambled loss (M 28, SD 18), which is consistent with
the findings of Clark et al. (2013). All differences were statistically
significant (ps  .015). In other words, we observed a “hot hand”
effect (i.e., subjects expected another win after a gambled win
more than after a gambled loss; Ayton & Fischer, 2004) rather than
a gambler’s fallacy (i.e., the fallacious belief that a run of inde-
pendent events must be broken). It is possible that the gamblers
fallacy influences behavior primarily after longer runs of wins/
losses (Ayton & Fischer, 2004); unfortunately, we could not test
this idea in Experiment 2 because we did not have enough obser-
vations for the various run lengths for each subject.
The association between start RT and the ratings. For each
subject and statement, we calculated the median rating as a func-
tion of the outcome of the previous trial; then we calculated start
RT for trials with a rating lower or equal to the corresponding
median rating and trials with a rating higher than the correspond-
ing median rating. Six subjects were excluded from these analyses
because there were not enough trials for all cells (i.e., N  5).
For both statements, we analyzed start RT with a repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with outcome of the
previous trial (nongamble, gambled loss, gambled win) and rating
(rating  median vs. rating  median) as within-subjects factors.
The descriptive statistics appear in Table 2. As discussed above,
start RT was influenced by the outcome of the previous trial, but
the median split analyses did not reveal other significant effects
(see Table B2 in Appendix B).
Discussion. Consistent with Experiment 1, we found that start
RT was shorter after a gambled loss than after a nongamble (the
baseline) or a gambled win. Furthermore, the rating analyses
revealed a “hot hand” effect rather than a gamblers fallacy. Thus,
the findings of Experiment 2 are inconsistent with the cognitive
control accounts discussed in the introduction. According to these
accounts, people should become more cautious after a negative or
suboptimal outcome. However, our findings indicate that losing
led to impulsive actions, rather than cautious actions.
Experiments 3a and 3b
The results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that performance in
our gambling task is influenced by the outcome of the previous
trial. Work in other domains indicates that sequential effects are
often modulated by repetition of information from the previous
trial. For example, congruency sequence effects (i.e., a reduction in
conflict when conflict also occurred on the preceding trial; Duthoo,
Abrahamse, Braem, Boehler, & Notebaert, 2014; Egner, 2008) and
other sequential effects (e.g., Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings, &
Horner, 2014; Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren,
2014) are partly due to the retrieval of stimulus-specific associa-
Table 2
Overview of the Ratings and Mean Start RT as a Function of the Median Split (Rating  Median Rating or  Median Rating) and
the Preceding Gambling Trial in Experiment 2
Non-gamble Loss Gambled win
Statement Median Median Median Median Median Median
Pleased with the outcome
Rating 37 (16) 57 (12) 10 (8) 26 (15) 58 (16) 83 (12)
Start RT 487 (168) 505 (181) 397 (132) 415 (136) 456 (200) 443 (148)
Increased chances of winning
Rating 29 (17) 46 (19) 20 (16) 40 (19) 34 (20) 53 (23)
Start RT 483 (175) 506 (171) 395 (130) 420 (138) 450 (176) 444 (173)
Note. RT  reaction time. SD in parentheses.
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tions from memory (e.g., stimulus-response or stimulus-outcome
associations). Even task contexts may become associated with a
particular response or outcome (Perruchet, 2015) and influence
subsequent performance (e.g., Bouton, 2004; Redish, Jensen,
Johnson, & Kurth-Nelson, 2007). Therefore, Experiments 3a and
3b examined whether the sequential effects of winning and losing
were also modulated by the repetition of stimulus information.
Method
Subjects. Forty new students (Experiment 3a: N  20; Ex-
periment 3b: N  20; 17 males; age: M  19.4 years, SD  1.3)
from the University of Exeter participated for monetary compen-
sation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the gam-
bling task. Three subjects (one in Experiment 3a and two in
Experiment 3b) were replaced because they rarely gambled (see
Experiment 1).
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analyses. These were
the same as in Experiment 1 except for the following: The back-
ground of the screen (i.e., the wallpaper) was a high-resolution
jpeg image of a casino building. There were two images (one of the
Bellagio and one of the Venetian—both are casinos in Las Vegas,
NV). Image order was randomized; consequently, on approxi-
mately half of the trials, the image changed. In both experiments,
the image of the casino was presented throughout the whole trial
(i.e., from the “Press a key to start the next trial” screen to the
“Outcome” screen; see Figure 1). In Experiment 3b, we introduced
a short intertrial interval (500 ms), during which a high-resolution
image of the famous Las Vegas Strip served as background.
For the analysis, we used the trial exclusion criteria of Experi-
ment 1. This resulted in a data reduction of 3.2% in Experiment 3a
and 3.9% in Experiment 3b. The intertrial interval manipulation
did not influence performance significantly, so we collapsed the
data of Experiments 3a and 3b in the analyses reported below.
Results and Discussion
Consistent with Experiments 1 and 2, subjects started the next
trial sooner after a gambled loss (M  612 ms; SD  204) than
after a gambled win (M  723 ms; SD  269) or a nongamble
(M  772 ms; SD  197); both ps  .001 (see Table 1). The
difference between trials following gambled wins and trials fol-
lowing nongambles was also statistically significant (see Table 1).
Repetition or alternation of the “casino” background did not sig-
nificantly influence start RTs (ps  .17; Appendix B).2 Possibly,
subjects did not pay enough attention to the background image,
which could have influenced the learning and the retrieval of the
relevant associations (e.g., Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, &
Verbruggen, 2016). Alternatively, the sequential effects of wins
and losses may not be stimulus or context dependent. We will
further explore the latter possibility in Experiments 4–5.
Experiments 4a and 4b
In Experiments 1–3, start RTs were consistently shorter after a
gambled loss than after a nongamble, suggesting that losing in our
gambling task induces impulsive actions. As indicated in the
introduction of Experiments 3a and 3b, many sequential effects are
task or context dependent and they do not necessarily transfer from
one task to another (Braem, Abrahamse, Duthoo, & Notebaert,
2014). To further explore the generality of the sequential effects of
gambling, we used a task-switching manipulation in Experiments
4a and 4b: Subjects alternated between the gambling task in which
they could win or lose points and a perceptual decision-making
task in which they could not win or lose points.
Method
Subjects. Forty new students (Experiment 4a: N  20; Ex-
periment 4b: N  20; males: 11; age: M  19.8 years, SD  1.5)
from the University of Exeter participated for monetary compen-
sation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the gam-
bling task. One subject in Experiment 4a was replaced because
they rarely gambled (see Experiment 1).
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. Subjects continuously
alternated between the gambling task and a perceptual decision-
making task (in other words, every trial was a task switch; Kiesel
et al., 2010; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010).
The gambling task was the same as in Experiment 1, apart from the
following: every gambling trial started with the message “Press a
key to start the next ‘choice’ trial.”
In the perceptual decision-making task, each trial started with
the message “Press a key to start the next ‘dark versus light’ trial.”
Immediately after subjects had pressed a key, a gray circle (diam-
eter: 5 cm) was presented in the center of the screen against a white
background. Subjects had to decide whether it was dark
(RGB 127-127-127) or light (RGB 127-127-127), by pressing
the left or right arrow key, respectively. They were instructed to
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The circle remained
on the screen until a response was executed. Feedback about
performance (“Correct response” or “Incorrect response”) was
presented for 1 s after every trial.
In Experiment 4a, the difficulty level was continuously adjusted
using a two-up/one-down tracking procedure to obtain an error
probability of approximately .30 (Leek, 2001). After two correct
trials, the RGB difference between dark (e.g., RGB: 120-120-120)
and light (e.g., RGB: 134-134-134) was reduced (e.g., RGB:
123-123-123 vs. RGB: 131-131-131), making the discrimination
more difficult. The RGB difference increased after each incorrect
trial, making the discrimination easier again. To determine
whether sequential effects were influenced by overall error rate in
the perceptual decision-making task, we made the task slightly
easier in Experiment 4b. More specifically, the difficulty level was
adjusted using a three-up/one-down tracking procedure to obtain
an error probability of approximately .20: The RGB difference was
reduced after every three correct trials, but increased after every
incorrect trial.
Analysis. Subjects continuously alternated between the gam-
bling task and the decision-making task. This influenced our
exclusion criteria. In the gambling task, we excluded trials on
which start RT was above 5,000 ms or choice RT was above 2,500
ms, and gambling trials on which subjects pressed a key that was
2 For casino repetition trials, start RT was 596 ms (SD  181) after a
gambled loss, 707 ms (SD  250) after a gambled win, and 755 ms (SD 
180) after a nongamble. For casino-alternation trials, start RT was 628 ms
(SD  225) after a gambled loss, 739 ms (SD  288) after a gambled win,
and 789 ms (SD  213) after a nongamble.
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not part of the response set (i.e., incorrect gambling trials). We also
excluded gambling trials that were preceded by an incorrect gam-
bling trial (i.e., when Trial n – 2 was an incorrect gambling trial).
We did not exclude gambling trials that were preceded by an
incorrect decision-making response (Trial n – 1) as there were
enough incorrect responses in the perceptual decision-making task
for a sequential analysis. In the perceptual decision-making task,
we excluded trials that followed an excluded gambling trial (Trial
n – 1), trials on which start RT was above 5,000 ms, and trials on
which response latency was above 2,500 ms. This resulted in a
data reduction of 3.8% in Experiment 4a and 4.6% in Experiment
4b. Experiment did not interact with the effects of the outcome of
the previous trial, so we collapsed the data of the two experiments
in the analyses reported below. For the analysis of choice latencies
in the perceptual decision-making task, we included only trials on
which subjects responded correctly to the gray circle.
Results and Discussion
Performance in the perceptual decision-making task.
Consistent with the gambling experiments, subjects started the
perceptual decision-making task sooner after a gambled loss (M 
465 ms, SD  161) than after a gambled win (M  575 ms; SD 
195) or a nongamble (M 605 ms; SD 185); both ps .01 (see
Table 3). The numerical start RT difference between trials that
followed a nongamble and trials that followed a gambled win was
not statistically significant (see Table 3).
In the perceptual decision-making task, subjects responded
faster to the gray circle after a gambled loss (M  903, SD  193)
than after a gambled win (M 951 ms, SD 196) or a nongamble
(M  939 ms, SD  177); both ps  .029 (see Table 3). The
choice latency difference between trials that followed a nongamble
and trials that followed a gambled win was not statistically signif-
icant (see Table 3). Combined, the start RTs and choice latencies
indicate that losses can have a “general” effect on impulsive action
(i.e., faster responses).
Finally, we analyzed the proportion of correct trials in the
perceptual decision-making task. The small numerical accuracy
differences between trials following a loss (M .699, SD .076),
a gambled win (M  .712, SD  .107), and a nongamble (M 
.712, SD  .052) were not statistically significant (Table 3 and
Appendix B).
Performance in the gambling task. Subjects alternated be-
tween the gambling task and the perceptual decision-making task.
We tested whether the outcome of the previous gambling trial (i.e.,
Trial n – 2) still influenced performance on the current gambling
trial (despite the intervening perceptual decision-making trial). For
completeness, we also tested whether gambling performance was
influenced by the immediately preceding perceptual decision-
making trial (i.e., Trial n – 1); we present these analyses in
Supplementary Materials.
The outcome of a last gambling trial (Trial n – 2) still influenced
performance on the current gambling trial. Start RT was shorter
after a gambled loss (M  524; SD  146) than after a gambled
win (M  605; SD  160) or a nongamble (M  572; SD  161);
both ps  .001 (see Table 1). Thus, doing a nongambling task
between two successive gambles did not influence the effect of
Table 3
Overview of Planned Comparisons to Further Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on Performance in the Perceptual
Decision-Making Task of Experiment 4 and the Go Task of Experiment 5
Experiment diff Lower CI Upper CI t p gav BF
Experiment 4
Start RT
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 140 111 168 9.872 .001 .798 2.38  109
Nongamble vs. gambled win 30 11 71 1.485 .146 .156 .47
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 110 138 81 7.805 .001 .611 6.77  106
Go accuracy
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .013 .011 .037 1.102 .277 .201 .30
Nongamble vs. gambled win .000 .034 .034 .022 .983 .005 .17
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .013 .047 .022 .746 .460 .137 .22
Go RT
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 35 4 67 2.284 .028 .190 1.72
Nongamble vs. gambled win 13 37 12 1.043 .303 .067 .28
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 48 76 21 3.525 .001 .245 28.07
Experiment 5
Start RT
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 118 75 161 5.544 .001 .450 8073
Nongamble vs. gambled win 9 31 49 .456 .651 .032 .19
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 109 147 72 5.900 .001 .370 23,318
Go accuracy
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .021 .002 .039 2.240 .031 .318 1.58
Nongamble vs. gambled win .006 .026 .014 .611 .545 .089 .20
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .027 .046 .007 2.744 .009 .346 4.41
Go RT
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 12 5 30 1.423 .163 .070 .432
Nongamble vs. gambled win 14 3 31 1.711 .095 .081 .646
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 2 14 17 .247 .806 .011 .176
Note. RT  reaction time; diff  difference; CI  confidence interval; gav  Hedge’s average g; BF  Bayes factor. For all comparisons, df  39.
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losses much. However, the intervening task influenced the differ-
ence between gambled wins and nongambles. In Experiments 1–3,
starts RTs were shorter after a gambled win than after a non-
gamble. In this experiment, start RT was longer when Trial n – 2
was a gambled win compared with a nongamble (see Table 1).
Experiment 5
Experiments 4a and 4b showed that losing a gamble can influ-
ence performance in a seemingly unrelated perceptual decision-
making task. In other words, losses generally induce faster re-
sponses on subsequent trials (whatever the nature of that trial).
Furthermore, we found that performing a difficult discrimination
task did not modulate the effect of losses on start RT in the
gambling task much. These findings are remarkable, and could
indicate that cognitive control processes have little influence on
loss-induced impulsivity. Therefore, we explored in Experiment 5
whether the effect of losses on response latencies was also ob-
served in a task in which subjects typically respond with caution.
More specifically, subjects alternated between the gambling task
and a stop-signal task (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). As discussed
in the introduction, many studies have shown that people slow
down and respond more cautiously when they expect a stop signal
to occur. Therefore, Experiment 5 explored whether a loss in the
gambling task could influence response latencies in the stop-signal
task as well.
Method
Subjects. Forty new students (11 males; age: M  19.9 years,
SD  2.5) from the University of Exeter participated for monetary
compensation (£5) or partial course credit, plus money won in the
gambling task. One subject was replaced because they rarely
gambled (see Experiment 1), and two subjects were replaced
because pcorrect in the stop-signal task was below .80.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. Subjects continuously
alternated between the gambling task and a stop-signal task (in
other words, every trial was a task switch). The gambling task was
the same as in Experiment 4.
In the stop-signal task, each trial started with the message “Press
a key to start the next ‘dark vs. light’ trial”. Immediately after
subjects had pressed a key, a gray circle (diameter: 5 cm) was
presented in the center of the screen against a white background.
Subjects had to decide whether it was dark (RGB: 88-88-88) or
light (RGB: 167-167-167) by pressing the left or right arrow key,
respectively. The circle remained on the screen for 1,500 ms,
regardless of RT. On 25% of the trials (stop-signal trials), the
circle turned blue (RGB: 0-150-255) after a variable delay, in-
structing the subjects to withhold their response. The stop-signal
delay was initially set at 500 ms, and continuously adjusted ac-
cording to a one-up/one-down tracking procedure to obtain a
probability of stopping of .50: stop-signal delay decreased by 50
ms when a subject responded on a stop-signal trial, but increased
by 50 ms when they successfully stopped (Verbruggen & Logan,
2009a).
Analyses. For the gambling task, we used the same exclusion
criteria as in Experiment 4. In the stop-signal task, we excluded
trials that followed an excluded gambling trial and trials on which
start RT was above 5,000 ms, which resulted in a data reduction of
2.5%. For the analysis of go latencies in the stop-signal task, we
included only trials on which subjects responded correctly to the
gray circle. There were not enough stop-signal trials to examine
the effect of the gambling outcome on stop performance.3
Results and Discussion
Go performance in the stop-signal task. Subjects started the
stop-signal task sooner after a gambled loss (M  633 ms, SD 
266) than after a gambled win (M  742, SD  318) or a
nongamble (M 751 ms, SD 254); both ps .01 (see Table 3).
The numerical difference between trials that followed a nongamble
and trials that followed a gambled win was not statistically signif-
icant (see Table 3).
Go accuracy was lower after a gambled loss (M  .905, SD 
.073) than after a nongamble (M  .926, SD  .055) or a gambled
win (M  .932, SD  .080); both ps  .032 (see Table 3). Go
latencies (i.e., once the stop-signal task had been initiated) were
similar for trials following a loss (M  725 ms, SD  176), a
nongamble (M  737, SD  168), and a gambled win (M  723,
SD  177); none of the numerical differences were statistically
significant (see Table 3). This finding suggests that proactive
control adjustments can partly counteract loss-induced impulsiv-
ity. The absence of a go latency difference indicates the go
accuracy difference is not due to a simple speed/accuracy trade-off
in the stop task itself. However, it is possible that by starting the
next trial sooner after a loss, subjects were less prepared, resulting
in lower accuracy.
Performance in the gambling task. We explored whether the
outcome of the last gambling trial (Trial n – 2) still influenced
performance on the current gambling trial (trial n), despite the
intervening stop-signal task (Trial n – 1). Start RT was 720 ms
(SD  247) after a gambled loss, 736 ms (SD  240) after a
gambled win, and 748 ms (SD  242) after a nongamble. How-
ever, the individual contrasts were no longer significant (see Table
1). Thus, performing a cognitive control tasks in which people are
usually cautious attenuated loss-induced impulsivity.
Combined Analysis Start Latencies
The results of Experiments 1–5 indicate that gambled losses and
wins affect start RTs on the next trial. Before we discuss the
implications of these findings, we report the outcome of a two
extra analyses.
First, we explored whether the effect of gambled wins and losses
was influenced by the probability of winning and the amount of the
previous gamble. As discussed in the Method section of Experi-
ment 1, the amount subjects could win when they gambled in-
creased when probability of winning decreased (and vice versa;
see Appendix A). To obtain sufficient observations for this anal-
yses (N 5 for each cell), we collapsed trials for which pwin of the
previous gamble option was .67 and .50 (that is, a relatively “high”
pwin but lower amount), and trials for which pwin of the previous
gamble option was .25 or .33 (that is, lower pwin but higher
amount). The corresponding amounts are shown in Appendix A.
3 This would require hundreds of signal trials as the outcome of the
previous trial cannot be predicted and some subjects do not gamble very
often.
155WINNING AND LOSING
Because some subjects only gambled when pwin was either high or
low, we had to exclude 43 subjects (leaving 137 subjects for the
analyses reported below). Start RT was analyzed by means of a 3
(Outcome Previous Trial: nongamble, gambled loss, gambled win)
by 2 (pwin of the Gamble Option of the Previous Trial: high or low)
repeated-measures ANOVA. Figure 2 shows that the effect of a
gambled loss on start RT of the next trial was more pronounced
when the probability of winning the gamble was low (and there-
fore the potential win was a large amount). The interaction be-
tween trial outcome and probability of winning was significant,
F(2, 272)  5.457, p  .005, gen2  0.002. A follow-up t test
revealed that start RT after a gambled loss was shorter when the
gamble was associated with a low pwin but high amount, compared
to when it was associated with a higher pwin but a lower amount;
t(136)  2.91, p  .004, gav  .164, Bayes factor (BF)  5.35.
Start RTs after a nongamble or a gambled win were not modulated
much by pwin of the previous trial (both ps  .148; furthermore,
Bayesian analyses provided substantial support for the null hy-
pothesis, BFs  0.27). We discuss the implications of this finding
in the General Discussion. Note that in this combined analysis, the
main effect of trial outcome is similar to the effects observed in
Experiments 1–5; thus, the exclusion of 43 subjects did not alter
the overall data pattern much.
Second, we analyzed the difference between start RT of the
current trial (Trial n) and start RT of the immediately preceding
trial (Trial n – 1). Measurements of posterror slowing can be
contaminated by global fluctuations in performance over the
course of an experiment. For example, when subjects are tempo-
rarily distracted, they are more likely to make an error and average
RT is likely to be higher. However, this will influence the mea-
surement of posterror slowing because “posterror trials” are more
likely to come from blocks in which the subject was distracted
(hence, RT was long) than from blocks in which the subject was
focused (hence, RT was short). There is a solution for this prob-
lem: posterror slowing can be quantified as the RT difference
between the posterror trial and the associated preerror trial (e.g.,
Dutilh, van Ravenzwaaij, et al., 2012). Similar solutions have been
proposed to control for global fluctuations in other paradigms (e.g.,
Nelson, Boucher, Logan, Palmeri, & Schall, 2010).
It is possible that our start RT measurements were also contam-
inated by global fluctuations (e.g., if subjects only gambled when
they were focused or motivated, start RT should be shorter after a
gamble than after a nongamble). To control for such global effects,
we analyzed the “Trial n minus Trial n – 1 difference.” For this
analysis, we excluded all trials that were excluded in the main
analyses, plus trials for which the absolute start RT difference with
the previous trial was larger than 5 s (we included them in the main
analyses above to boost the trial numbers). The difference score
analysis showed that the start RT difference was negative (indi-
cating shorter latencies) after a gambled loss (M  72 ms, 95%
confidence interval [CI] [85, 58]), close to zero after a gam-
bled win (M  2 ms, 95% CI [12, 16]), and positive after a
nongamble (M  16 ms, 95% CI [9, 24]). The “gambled loss
versus gambled win” and the “gambled loss versus nongamble”
differences were both statistically significant; t(179)  6.74, p 
.001, gav  .78, BF  3.18  107, and t(179)  9.23, p  .001,
gav  1.21, BF  7.12  1013, respectively. Thus, the sequential
effect of losses on start RTs is not due to global fluctuations. The
“gambled win versus nongamble” difference was not significant,
t(179)  1.54, p  .13, gav  .19, BF  0.27.
Overview of the Choice Analyses
For completeness, we also analyzed how the probability of
gambling and the latency of the choice response were influenced
by the outcome of the previous trial. In Appendices C and D, we
present the descriptive and inferential statistics for each individual
experiment. In this section, we will focus on the combined analysis
only.
Probability of Gambling in Experiments 1–5
We combined the pgamble data of all experiments to establish
whether the postreinforcement effect (decreased gambling after a
win) and, loss chasing (increased gambling after a loss), or a
combination of the two influenced the probability of gambling.
Note that we excluded the rating trials of Experiment 2 from this
combined analysis because analyses had revealed that the ratings
influenced subsequent performance (see Appendix C).
pgamble was lowest after a gambled win (M  .44, SD  .20),
intermediate after a nongamble (M  .48, SD  .20), and highest
after a gambled loss (M  .51, SD  .19). All differences were
statistically significant (see Table 4). In sum, both postreinforce-
ment effects and loss chasing influenced choice in our gambling
task (although the effect sizes reported in Table 4 and Appendix C
indicate that the loss chasing effect was relatively small; further-
more, the Bayesian analysis of the “nongamble vs. gambled loss”
































Figure 2. Start reaction time as a function of the outcome of the previous
trial and pwin and amount of the previous gamble (When probability of
winning was low, the amount was always high; see Appendix A). The error
bars reflect within-subject confidence intervals (Morey, 2008). Note that
we observed a similar numerical pattern when all subjects were included;
however, we could not perform univariate analyses when all subjects were
included because of missing cells.
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Choice RT in Experiments 1–5
After both options (i.e., the nongamble option and the gamble
option) had been presented separately, subjects saw them again
together (one on the left and one on the right of the screen). At this
point, they could choose one option by pressing the left- or
right-arrow key of the keyboard for the left or right option,
respectively (see Figure 1). Here we examined whether the latency
of the choice responses (choice RTs) were influenced by the
outcome of the previous trial.
Choice RT was shortest after a gambled loss (M  698 ms,
SD  215 ms), intermediate after a nongamble (M  713 ms,
SD  227), and longest after a gambled win (M  731 ms, SD 
239). All individual differences were statistically significant (see
Table 4). The difference between gambled losses and nongambles
is consistent with the start RT differences reported in the main
manuscript. However, choice RT was longer after a gambled win
than after a nongamble, whereas start RT was shorter after a
gambled win than after a nongamble.
General Discussion
The present study explored the effects of winning and losing on
impulsive action. Work in various domains indicates that people
slow down after errors, conflict, or suboptimal outcomes. In other
words, they become more cautious. Such sequential effects have
been attributed to changes in cognitive control settings. The cog-
nitive control account predicted that response latencies should
increase after a gambled loss compared with a nongambling base-
line or a gambled win in our gambling task. However, in all
experiments, start RT was shorter after a gambled loss than after a
gambled win or a nongamble. These findings are inconsistent with
the idea that people become more cautious after a loss; instead,
they indicate that losses in a gambling task can induce impulsive
actions.4 Furthermore, the results of Experiment 4 and the similar
(albeit smaller) effects on choice RTs in the gambling task (see
Overview of the Choice Analyses) indicate that loss-induced im-
pulsivity does not only influence task-unspecific responses (i.e.,
the start response, for which there is no correct or incorrect
response) but also task-specific responses (i.e., the choice response
in the perceptual-decision-making task and the choice response in
the gambling task). In other words, losses seem to have a general
effect on actions.
In Experiments 1 and 3, start RT was also significantly shorter
after a gambled win than after a nongamble (similar numerical
trends were observed in Experiment 2 and in the neutral tasks of
Experiments 4 and 5). This suggests that start RT is generally
faster after a previous gamble than after a nongamble, although it
should be noted that the overall numerical difference between
nongambles and gambled wins was not significant when we con-
trolled for global fluctuations (see above).
Affective Consequences of Gambling and
Negative Outcomes
Our findings are inconsistent with popular cognitive control
accounts; instead, they suggest emotional influences on action
control. Affect has multiple dimensions or components that can be
influenced by the outcome of a gamble, including affective valence
and motivational intensity.
Ratings obtained in Experiment 2 suggest that a gambled win
induces positive affect, whereas a gambled loss induces negative
affect. Negative affect after a loss could reflect frustration, regret,
or disappointment. Frustration refers to a strong negative affective
state that is induced by a failure to obtain an incentive or the
blockage of a desired goal. Disappointment refers to the realization
that the outcome is worse than expected or hoped for (e.g., the
amount associated with the gamble option is 60 points, but the
outcome is 0 points), whereas regret5 refers to the realization that
another choice (i.e., not gambling in our task) would have pro-
duced a better outcome (e.g., 30 points). Such negative affective
states can modulate motivational intensity. Previous work suggests
that subsequent behavior is energized (Amsel, 1958, 1992; Carver,
2006; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Mikulincer, 1988) and ap-
proach tendencies are intensified (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones,
& Price, 2013) in an attempt to overcome frustration. For example,
Amsel (1958) placed hungry rats in a box that consisted of two
runways in which the rats expected to find food. He observed that
rats ran faster in the second runway when they did not find the
expected food in the first runway. He labeled this the “frustration
effect” (Amsel, 1958, 1992). Similarly, a recent study showed that
rats consumed their food faster after they had experienced “regret”
compared with a control condition (Steiner & Redish, 2014).
4 Extra analyses (also presented in Supplementary Materials) revealed
that gambling per se is not an impulsive action: For many subjects, the
latency of the choice response (to gamble or not) was longer for gambles
than for nongambles for many subjects.
5 Some have argued that regret is a special (cognitive) form of frustration
(Reid, 1986).
Table 4
Overview of the Combined Analysis to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on Choice Data
Dependent variable diff Lower CI Upper CI t p gav BF
pgamble
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .029 .052 .005 2.434 .016 .149 1.47
Nongamble vs. gambled win .044 .067 .067 3.725 .001 .217 60.12
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .073 .049 .096 6.149 .001 .370 6.77  106
Choice latency
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 14 3 26 2.499 .013 .065 1.71
Nongamble vs. gambled win 18 32 4 2.486 .014 .078 1.66
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 32 45 20 4.950 .001 .143 6,833
Note. diff  difference; CI  confidence interval; gav  Hedge’s average g; BF  Bayes factor.
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The start RT results of the present study are consistent with the idea
that negative outcomes can increase motivational intensity and ap-
proach behavior. In our task, each trial started with the presentation of
a certain amount of points, and subjects could lose these points when
they gambled. In other words, a gambled loss (i.e., outcome  0
points) in our task is a negative event. Therefore, the shorter start RTs
(and choice RTs) after a loss compared with the nongambling baseline
indicate that negative affect can induce faster responses (i.e., impul-
sive actions). Note that findings of the combined analyses (see Figure
2) suggests that a failure to obtain a large reward (i.e., when pwin was
low) had a stronger effect on start RT than a failure to obtain a smaller
reward (i.e., when pwin was high). This suggests that start RT was
modulated by frustration or the disappointment of not obtaining the
larger amount of the gamble.
Many theories assume that affective states facilitate actions and
induce impulsivity (e.g., Cyders & Smith, 2008; Frijda, Ridderinkhof,
& Rietveld, 2014). Positive affect is typically associated with ap-
proach behavior, whereas negative affect is typically associated with
avoidance behavior (Braver et al., 2014). Thus, increased impulsivity
or approach behavior after negative events may seem counterintuitive.
However, it could be functionally relevant. Quickly continuing the
game after a gambled loss may help to escape or relieve the negative
affective state (see also e.g., Billieux et al., 2010; Cyders & Smith,
2008). It may also help to close the gap between the current state (no
reward) and the desired state (a reward; cf. Braver et al., 2014).
Work in other control domains also suggests that emotional and
motivational influences can modulate sequential effects (although not
necessarily in the same way as in the present study). For example, in
Stroop and flanker tasks, conflict resolution and between-trial adap-
tations are enhanced when an “avoidance” response or state is induced
(Schouppe, De Houwer, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2012; Hengstler,
Holland, van Steenbergen, & van Knippenberg, 2014). By contrast,
conflict adaptations are reduced when reward is delivered (e.g., van
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). More generally, some have
argued that conflict or errors could be construed as aversive events
that are to be avoided in the future (Botvinick, 2007; Dreisbach &
Fischer, 2012; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013). This aversive signal could
then lead to adjustments in behavior. Thus, motivation and emotion
can influence sequential control adjustments in conflict tasks. This
conclusion is generally consistent with the findings of the present
study. However, in the case of conflict and errors, these adjustments
lead to response slowing (i.e., avoidance behavior), whereas we
observed increased impulsivity (i.e., approach behavior) after a neg-
ative outcome. In other words, the nature of the affect plays a critical
role.
Probability of Gambling
The combined analysis revealed that pgamble was higher after a
gambled loss than after a nongamble, and lowest after a gambled win.
Again, this pattern is inconsistent with the idea that people become
more cautious after a loss. However, our pgamble results are consistent
with previous studies (see the introduction), and support the idea that
subjective value or utility of options is context dependent and highly
malleable (Stewart, Reimers, & Harris, 2015; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart,
& Brown, 2011). For example, several models of decision-making
assume that the subjective value of an option depends on immediately
preceding gains and losses (for a short review, see Smith et al., 2009).
Reduced gambling after a gambled win (especially after a large win)
and increased gambling after a loss are consistent with this idea.
The pgamble results of the present study are also consistent with the
idea that affective components can modulate decision-making.
Emotion-based theories of decision making propose that emotional
states and feelings about expected outcomes influence choice (for
reviews, see Coricelli, Dolan, & Sirigu, 2007; Connolly & Zeelen-
berg, 2002; Mellers & McGraw, 2001). Consistent with this idea,
Campbell-Meiklejohn, Woolrich, Passingham, and Rogers (2008)
found in a functional MRI study that decisions to quit gambling were
associated with increased activation of brain regions associated with
the anticipation of negative events. By contrast, loss chasing was
associated with activation of brain regions often linked to reward
processing, appetitive states, and the experience of urges and cravings
(Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2011; Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.,
2008). Emotion-based theories of decision making could explain why
people gamble less after a gambled win than after a nongamble in our
task: After a gambled win, people are in a positive affective state, and
the anticipatory disappointment and regret associated with a loss may
steer them away from gambling again. Positive feelings may also
induce “coasting” (Carver, 2003), reducing further gambling efforts.
By contrast, engaging in a gamble after a loss may reduce the aversive
consequences of the loss.
Thus, wins and losses influenced both impulsive action and choice
in our task. But were these effects on action and choice related? An
extra analysis revealed that the “gambled loss versus gambled win”
start RT difference did not correlate with the “gambled loss versus
gambled win” pgamble difference, r(179)  .05, p  .523. This
(partial) dissociation between impulsive action (start RT) and choice
(pgamble) suggests that outcomes of a gamble can have distinct effects
on motivational intensity and affective valence. More generally, it is
consistent with the idea that expression of behavior involves two
components, namely what to do and how vigorously to do it (Guitart-
Masip, Beierholm, Dolan, Duzel, & Dayan, 2011; see also Berridge,
Robinson, & Aldridge, 2009). In many situations, these components
are tightly coupled, but clinical, cognitive and neuroscience research
indicates that they can be dissociated (Berridge et al., 2009). The
results of the present study may be another example of such a
dissociation.
Finally, the analyses of the individual experiments (see Appen-
dix C) revealed another interesting finding. Experiment 2 suggests
that encouraging subjects to pause and reflect influenced their
subsequent gambling behavior: compared with the nongambling
baseline, pgamble decreased after a loss on rating trials; by contrast,
there was a small (numerical) increase on no-rating trials (see
Appendix C). This is consistent with previous studies that showed
that presenting feedback and encouraging subjects to reflect on
their choices influences subsequent decision-making (Brand, 2008;
Corr & Thompson, 2014). The findings of Experiment 4 further
show that simply interrupting the flow of the gambling task is not
sufficient. In this experiment, the outcome of a gamble influenced
choice on the next gambling trial even when subjects had to
perform an unrelated task between the two successive gambles. In
other words, unless people are encouraged to reflect, interrupting
the game does not seem to modulate the effect of trial outcome on
pgamble much. However, the additional rating analyses for Exper-
iment 2 suggest that the beneficial effect of reflecting on the
outcome may be counteracted by fallacious beliefs, as pgamble
increased after a loss when subjects thought that their chances of
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winning had increased (see Appendix C). This finding could be
important for clinical applications, as it suggests that merely in-
troducing a “pause for reflection” may not be sufficient for reduc-
ing possible harmful effects of gambling in people with gambling-
related problems unless cognitive biases are also corrected.
Alternative Explanations
We attributed shorter start RTs after a gambled loss to the affective
consequences of gambling. Based on our findings, we can rule out
several alternative explanations. First, we can rule out that the start RT
pattern was due to expectancy violations. Previous work indicates that
unexpected events can slow responding (e.g., Leiva, Parmentier,
Elchlepp, & Verbruggen, 2015; Notebaert et al., 2009). When pwin of
the gamble option was .25, subjects could expect a loss when they
selected the gamble (and a gambled win was unexpected); by contrast,
when pwin of the gamble option was .67, subjects could expect a win
when they selected the gamble (and a loss was unexpected). Figure 2
shows that pwin and the associated amount of the gamble influenced
the start RT after a gambled loss but not after a gambled win.
Furthermore, start RTs were longest after the most predictable out-
come (i.e., the nongamble). Consequently, it seems highly unlikely
that the overall start RT pattern (start RT gambled loss  start RT
gambled win  start RT nongamble) was due to expectancy viola-
tions.
Second, we can rule out the possibility that the start RT pattern was
due to differences in feedback complexity. Processing complex feed-
back may slow responding on subsequent trials. However, the differ-
ence between “low pwin/high amount” losses and “high pwin/low
amount” losses (see Figure 2) is inconsistent with a feedback-
complexity account. After all, the exact same feedback message was
presented on both trial types (i.e., “outcome  0 points”). Further-
more, we propose that processing the feedback was most straightfor-
ward on nongambling trials because subjects already knew the out-
come of the trial before the feedback was presented. Finally, in an
extra analysis (not shown), we excluded trials that followed a trial on
which the guaranteed amount associated with the nongambling option
was 30 or 40. As shown in Appendix A, these amounts were occa-
sionally awarded on gamble trials as well. Thus, presenting these
amounts after a nongamble could have induced some conflict (assum-
ing that these amounts were associated with gambling). However, the
extra analyses revealed that start RT was still shorter after a loss than
after a nongamble (p .001) or a gambled win (p .001) when these
trials were excluded. Thus, we can rule out a feedback-complexity
account.
Third, we used nongambling trials as a baseline to determine if
gambled losses induced impulsive actions or if gambled wins induced
cautious actions. But subjects still received some points when they did
not gamble. In other words, it could be argued that the nongambled
trials were similar to gambled wins. Consequently, the start RT
pattern could reflect a postreinforcement pause (i.e., slower respond-
ing after the delivery of a reward), rather than a loss-induced
impulsivity effect. However, the ratings in Experiment 2 indi-
cate that nongambles were treated differently to gambled wins.
Furthermore, the postreinforcement pause account predicts that
start latencies should increase as a function of the magnitude of
the reward (Dixon et al., 2013). By contrast, we found that start
latencies were longer after a nongamble (lower amounts) than
after a gambled win (higher amounts). Finally, the results
depicted in Figure 2 suggest that the start RT pattern is largely
due to losses encouraging faster responses (rather than wins
encouraging slower responses).
Negative Urgency
The present study focused on “state” impulsivity (i.e., transient
changes in action control). However, Figure 3 shows that there were
large individual differences. How people respond to a loss could be
influenced by various personality traits. Trait impulsivity is a multi-
faceted construct. Several studies indicate that acting impulsively in
response to negative events (“negative urgency” trait) can be disso-
ciated from other impulsivity traits (Cyders & Smith, 2008). Impor-
tantly, negative urgency or mood-based rash action can be associated
with various behavioral addictions (including gambling; Billieux et
al., 2012; Michalczuk, Bowden-Jones, Verdejo-Garcia, & Clark,
2011) substance-use disorders, and risk taking (Settles et al., 2012).
















Figure 3. The start reaction time difference between trials following a gambled loss and trials following a
nongambling (i.e., the baseline) for each individual (total N  180; the x-axis shows “experimental subject”).
Negative values indicate loss-induced impulsivity.
159WINNING AND LOSING
We propose that our task measured negative urgency-like states. It
could be interesting to link state- and trait impulsivity. For example,
Gipson et al. (2012) found that subjects scoring high in negative
urgency showed increased response vigor (indicated by the number of
mouse clicks executed to obtain a new reward) and increased frus-
tration following unexpected reward omission compared to subjects
low in negative urgency. In the present study, we did not include
self-report questionnaires. Therefore, a future goal of our research
program is to further explore individual differences in our paradigm,
and examine how these are related to personality traits such as
negative urgency.
Conclusions
Research on gambling challenges many psychological and eco-
nomic models of decision making and human behavior (Clark, Studer,
Bruss, Tranel, & Bechara, 2014). In these models, humans are often
portrayed as rational beings who learn from their mistakes and opti-
mize their behavior. In the present study, we explored how people
adjust behavior after they have lost a gamble. We found that that
gambled losses induced impulsive actions. Furthermore, we observed
reduced risk-taking after a win but increased risk-taking after a loss.
In sum, we found only limited support for the idea that people
increase control settings after a negative outcome in gambling tasks.
Instead, our results indicate that emotional and motivational factors
largely determine how people respond to losses in a gambling task.
References
Alexander, W. H., & Brown, J. W. (2010). Computational models of
performance monitoring and cognitive control. Topics in Cognitive
Science, 2, 658 – 677. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010
.01085.x
Amsel, A. (1958). The role of frustrative nonreward in noncontinuous
reward situations. Psychological Bulletin, 55, 102–119. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1037/h0043125
Amsel, A. (1992). Frustration theory: Many years later. Psychological
Bulletin, 112, 396–399. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.112.3.396
Aron, A. R. (2011). From reactive to proactive and selective control:
Developing a richer model for stopping inappropriate responses. Bio-
logical Psychiatry, 69, e55–e68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych
.2010.07.024
Ayton, P., & Fischer, I. (2004). The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s
fallacy: Two faces of subjective randomness? Memory & Cognition, 32,
1369–1378. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/BF03206327
Berridge, K. C., Robinson, T. E., & Aldridge, J. W. (2009). Dissecting
components of reward: “Liking,” “wanting,” and learning. Current
Opinion in Pharmacology, 9, 65–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.coph
.2008.12.014
Best, M., Lawrence, N. S., Logan, G. D., McLaren, I. P. L., & Verbruggen,
F. (2016). Should I stop or should I go? The role of associations and
expectancies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, 42, 115–137. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000116
Billieux, J., Gay, P., Rochat, L., & Van der Linden, M. (2010). The role of
urgency and its underlying psychological mechanisms in problematic
behaviours. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 1085–1096. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2010.07.008
Billieux, J., Lagrange, G., Van der Linden, M., Lançon, C., Adida, M., &
Jeanningros, R. (2012). Investigation of impulsivity in a sample of
treatment-seeking pathological gamblers: A multidimensional perspec-
tive. Psychiatry Research, 198, 291–296. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.psychres.2012.01.001
Bissett, P. G., & Logan, G. D. (2011). Balancing cognitive demands:
Control adjustments in the stop-signal paradigm. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37, 392–404. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0021800
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making: Rec-
onciling two perspectives on anterior cingulate function. Cognitive,
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356–366. http://dx.doi.org/10
.3758/CABN.7.4.356
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D.
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Re-
view, 108, 624–652. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.108.3.624
Bouton, M. E. (2004). Context and behavioral processes in extinction.
Learning & Memory, 11, 485–494. http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/lm.78804
Braem, S., Abrahamse, E. L., Duthoo, W., & Notebaert, W. (2014). What
determines the specificity of conflict adaptation? A review, critical
analysis, and proposed synthesis. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1134.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01134
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10,
433–436.
Brand, M. (2008). Does the feedback from previous trials influence current
decisions? A study on the role of feedback processing in making deci-
sions under explicit risk conditions. Journal of Neuropsychology, 2,
431–443. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/174866407X220607
Braver, T. S., Krug, M. K., Chiew, K. S., Kool, W., Westbrook, J. A.,
Clement, N. J., . . . the MOMCAI group. (2014). Mechanisms of
motivation-cognition interaction: Challenges and opportunities. Cogni-
tive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 14, 443–472. http://dx.doi
.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0300-0
Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., & Shizgal, P. (2001).
Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experience of
monetary gains and losses. Neuron, 30, 619–639. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/S0896-6273(01)00303-8
Brevers, D., Noël, X., Bechara, A., Vanavermaete, N., Verbanck, P., &
Kornreich, C. (2015). Effect of casino-related sound, red light and pairs
on decision-making during the Iowa gambling task. Journal of Gambling
Studies, 31, 409–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10899-013-9441-2
Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2005). Learned predictions of error
likelihood in the anterior cingulate cortex. Science, 307, 1118–1121.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1105783
Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2008). A computational model of risk,
conflict, and individual difference effects in the anterior cingulate cor-
tex. Brain Research, 1202, 99–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres
.2007.06.080
Campbell-Meiklejohn, D., Wakeley, J., Herbert, V., Cook, J., Scollo, P.,
Ray, M. K., . . . Rogers, R. D. (2011). Serotonin and dopamine play
complementary roles in gambling to recover losses. Neuropsychophar-
macology, 36, 402–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/npp.2010.170
Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. K., Woolrich, M. W., Passingham, R. E., &
Rogers, R. D. (2008). Knowing when to stop: The brain mechanisms of
chasing losses. Biological Psychiatry, 63, 293–300. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.biopsych.2007.05.014
Carver, C. (2003). Pleasure as a sign you can attend to something else:
Placing positive feelings within a general model of affect. Cognition and
Emotion, 17, 241–261. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699930302294
Carver, C. S. (2006). Approach, avoidance, and the self-regulation of affect
and action. Motivation and Emotion, 30, 105–110. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1007/s11031-006-9044-7
Carver, C. S., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2009). Anger is an approach-related
affect: Evidence and implications. Psychological Bulletin, 135, 183–
204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013965
Clark, L. (2010). Decision-making during gambling: An integration of
cognitive and psychobiological approaches. Philosophical Transactions
of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological Sciences, 365,
319–330.
160 VERBRUGGEN, CHAMBERS, LAWRENCE, AND MCLAREN
Clark, L., & Limbrick-Oldfield, E. H. (2013). Disordered gambling: A
behavioral addiction. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23, 655–659.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2013.01.004
Clark, L., Studer, B., Bruss, J., Tranel, D., & Bechara, A. (2014). Damage
to insula abolishes cognitive distortions during simulated gambling.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 111, 6098–6103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1322295111
Cohen, J. R., & Lieberman, M. D. (2010). The common neural basis of
exerting self-control in multiple domains. In Self-control in society,
mind, and brain (Vol. 1, pp. 141–162). Oxford Scholarship Online
Monographs. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195391381.003
.0008
Connolly, T., & Zeelenberg, M. (2002). Regret in decision making. Cur-
rent Directions in Psychological Science, 11, 212–216. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/1467-8721.00203
Coricelli, G., Dolan, R. J., & Sirigu, A. (2007). Brain, emotion and decision
making: The paradigmatic example of regret. Trends in Cognitive Sci-
ences, 11, 258–265. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.04.003
Corr, P. J., & Thompson, S. J. (2014). Pause for thought: Response
perseveration and personality in gambling. Journal of Gambling Studies,
30, 889–900. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10899-013-9395-4
Cyders, M. A., & Smith, G. T. (2008). Emotion-based dispositions to rash
action: Positive and negative urgency. Psychological Bulletin, 134,
807–828. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0013341
Delfabbro, P. H., & Winefield, A. H. (1999). Poker-machine gambling: An
analysis of within session characteristics. British Journal of Psychology,
90, 425–439. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/000712699161503
De Martino, B., Kumaran, D., Seymour, B., & Dolan, R. J. (2006). Frames,
biases, and rational decision-making in the human brain. Science, 313,
684–687. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1128356
Dixon, M. J., MacLaren, V., Jarick, M., Fugelsang, J. A., & Harrigan, K. A.
(2013). The frustrating effects of just missing the jackpot: Slot machine
near-misses trigger large skin conductance responses, but no post-
reinforcement pauses. Journal of Gambling Studies, 29, 661–674. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10899-012-9333-x
Dreisbach, G., & Fischer, R. (2012). The role of affect and reward in the
conflict-triggered adjustment of cognitive control. Frontiers in Human
Neuroscience, 6, 342. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2012.00342
Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E. L., Braem, S., Boehler, C. N., & Notebaert, W.
(2014). The heterogeneous world of congruency sequence effects: An
update. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1001.
Dutilh, G., Vandekerckhove, J., Forstmann, B. U., Keuleers, E., Brysbaert,
M., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2012). Testing theories of post-error slow-
ing. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 74, 454–465. http://dx.doi
.org/10.3758/s13414-011-0243-2
Dutilh, G., van Ravenzwaaij, D., Nieuwenhuis, S., van der Maas, H. L.,
Forstmann, B. U., & Wagenmakers, E. (2012). How to measure post-
error slowing: A confound and a simple solution. Journal of Mathemat-
ical Psychology, 56, 208–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmp.2012.04
.001
Egner, T. (2008). Multiple conflict-driven control mechanisms in the
human brain. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 374–380. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.001
Elchlepp, H., Lavric, A., Chambers, C. D., & Verbruggen, F. (2016).
Proactive inhibitory control: A general biasing account. Cognitive Psy-
chology, 86, 27–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.01.004
Ernst, M., Nelson, E. E., McClure, E. B., Monk, C. S., Munson, S., Eshel,
N., . . . Pine, D. S. (2004). Choice selection and reward anticipation: An
fMRI study. Neuropsychologia, 42, 1585–1597. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2004.05.011
Forstmann, B. U., Dutil, G., Brown, S., Neumann, D., von Cramond, Y.,
Ridderinkhof, K. R., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2008). Striatum and pre-
SMA facilitate decision-making under time pressure. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 105, 17538–17542. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1073/pnas.0805903105
Frank, M. J. (2006). Hold your horses: A dynamic computational role for
the subthalamic nucleus in decision making. Neural Networks, 19,
1120–1136. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2006.03.006
Frijda, N. H., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & Rietveld, E. (2014). Impulsive action:
Emotional impulses and their control. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 518.
Fritz, J., & Dreisbach, G. (2013). Conflicts as aversive signals: Conflict
priming increases negative judgments for neutral stimuli. Cognitive,
Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 13, 311–317. http://dx.doi.org/10
.3758/s13415-012-0147-1
Garavan, H., & Stout, J. C. (2005). Neurocognitive insights into substance
abuse. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 195–201. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.tics.2005.02.008
Gipson, C. D., Beckmann, J. S., Adams, Z. W., Marusich, J. A., Nesland,
T. O., Yates, J. R., . . . Bardo, M. T. (2012). A translational behavioral
model of mood-based impulsivity: Implications for substance abuse.
Drug and Alcohol Dependence, 122, 93–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j
.drugalcdep.2011.09.014
Goudriaan, A. E., Oosterlaan, J., de Beurs, E., & van den Brink, W. (2005).
Decision making in pathological gambling: A comparison between
pathological gamblers, alcohol dependents, persons with Tourette syn-
drome, and normal controls. Cognitive Brain Research, 23, 137–151.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2005.01.017
Guitart-Masip, M., Beierholm, U. R., Dolan, R., Duzel, E., & Dayan, P.
(2011). Vigor in the face of fluctuating rates of reward: An experimental
examination. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 3933–3938. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1162/jocn_a_00090
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Holroyd, C. B., & Simons, R. F. (2006). The
feedback-related negativity reflects the binary evaluation of good versus
bad outcomes. Biological Psychology, 71, 148–154. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.04.001
Harmon-Jones, E., Harmon-Jones, C., & Price, T. F. (2013). What is
approach motivation? Emotion Review, 5, 291–295. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1177/1754073913477509
Hengstler, M., Holland, R. W., van Steenbergen, H., & van Knippenberg,
A. (2014). The influence of approach-avoidance motivational orientation
on conflict adaptation. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience,
14, 548–560. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13415-014-0295-6
Henson, R. N., Eckstein, D., Waszak, F., Frings, C., & Horner, A. J.
(2014). Stimulus-response bindings in priming. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 18, 376–384. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.03.004
Imas, A. (2014). The realization effect: Risk-taking after realized versus
paper losses. Retrieved from http://www.sjdm.org/archive/Imas2014
.pdf
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of
decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
1914185
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp,
A. M., & Koch, I. (2010). Control and interference in task switching: A
review. Psychological Bulletin, 136, 849 – 874. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1037/a0019842
Knoch, D., Gianotti, L. R. R., Pascual-Leone, A., Treyer, V., Regard, M.,
Hohmann, M., & Brugger, P. (2006). Disruption of right prefrontal
cortex by low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation
induces risk-taking behavior. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 6469–
6472. http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0804-06.2006
Lakens, D. (2013). Calculating and reporting effect sizes to facilitate
cumulative science: A practical primer for t-tests and ANOVAs. Fron-
tiers in Psychology, 4, 863. http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00863
Laming, D. R. J. (1968). Information theory of choice-reaction times. New
York, NY: Wiley.
161WINNING AND LOSING
Leek, M. R. (2001). Adaptive procedures in psychophysical research.
Perception & Psychophysics, 63, 1279–1292. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/
BF03194543
Leiva, A., Parmentier, F. B. R., Elchlepp, H., & Verbruggen, F. (2015).
Reorienting the mind: The impact of novel sounds on go/no-go perfor-
mance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and
Performance, 41, 1197–1202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xhp0000111
Losecaat Vermeer, A. B., Boksem, M. A., & Sanfey, A. G. (2014). Neural
mechanisms underlying context-dependent shifts in risk preferences.
NeuroImage, 103, 355–363. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage
.2014.09.054
Mellers, B. A. (2000). Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences.
Psychological Bulletin, 126, 910–924. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.126.6.910
Mellers, B. A., & McGraw, A. P. (2001). Anticipated emotions as guides
to choice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 210–214.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00151
Mellers, B., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I. (1999). Emotion-based choice.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 332–345. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.128.3.332
Michalczuk, R., Bowden-Jones, H., Verdejo-Garcia, A., & Clark, L.
(2011). Impulsivity and cognitive distortions in pathological gamblers
attending the U.K. National Problem Gambling Clinic: A preliminary
report. Psychological Medicine, 41, 2625–2635. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1017/S003329171100095X
Mikulincer, M. (1988). Reactance and helplessness following exposure to
unsolvable problems: The effects of attributional style. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 54, 679–686. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
0022-3514.54.4.679
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A.,
& Wager, T. D. (2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions
and their contributions to complex “frontal lobe” tasks: A latent variable
analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41, 49–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/
cogp.1999.0734
Morey, R. D. (2008). Confidence intervals from normalized data: A cor-
rection to Cousineau (2005). Tutorial in Quantitative Methods for Psy-
chology, 4, 61–64.
Nelson, M. J., Boucher, L., Logan, G. D., Palmeri, T. J., & Schall, J. D.
(2010). Nonindependent and nonstationary response times in stopping
and stepping saccade tasks. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 72,
1913–1929. http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/APP.72.7.1913
Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., Holroyd, C. B., Schurger, A., & Cohen, J. D.
(2004). Sensitivity of electrophysiological activity from medial frontal
cortex to utilitarian and performance feedback. Cerebral Cortex, 14,
741–747. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhh034
Notebaert, W., Houtman, F., Opstal, F. V., Gevers, W., Fias, W., &
Verguts, T. (2009). Post-error slowing: An orienting account. Cognition,
111, 275–279. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.002
Perruchet, P. (2015). Dissociating conscious expectancies from automatic
link formation in associative learning: A review on the so-called Per-
ruchet effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning
and Cognition, 41, 105–127. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xan0000060
Potenza, M. N. (2014). The neural bases of cognitive processes in gam-
bling disorder. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18, 429–438. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1016/j.tics.2014.03.007
Purcell, B. A., & Kiani, R. (2016). Neural mechanisms of post-error
adjustments of decision policy in parietal cortex. Neuron, 89, 658–671.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.027
R Development Core Team. (2015). R: A language and environment for
statistical computing (Version 3.2.3) [Computer software]. Retrieved
from https://www.r-project.org/index.html
Rabbitt, P. M., & Phillips, S. (1967). Error-detection and correction laten-
cies as a function of S-R compatibility. The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 19, 37– 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
14640746708400065
Rabbitt, P., & Rodgers, B. (1977). What does a man do after he makes an
error? An analysis of response programming. The Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 29, 727–743. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
14640747708400645
Redish, A. D., Jensen, S., Johnson, A., & Kurth-Nelson, Z. (2007). Rec-
onciling reinforcement learning models with behavioral extinction and
renewal: Implications for addiction, relapse, and problem gambling.
Psychological Review, 114, 784–805. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.114.3.784
Reid, R. L. (1986). The psychology of the near miss. Journal of Gambling
Behavior, 2, 32–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01019932
Ridderinkhof, K. R., van den Wildenberg, W. P. M., Segalowitz, S. J., &
Carter, C. S. (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms of cognitive control:
The role of prefrontal cortex in action selection, response inhibition,
performance monitoring, and reward-based learning. Brain and Cogni-
tion, 56, 129–140. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bandc.2004.09.016
Robinson, M. J., Anselme, P., Fischer, A. M., & Berridge, K. C. (2014).
Initial uncertainty in Pavlovian reward prediction persistently elevates
incentive salience and extends sign-tracking to normally unattractive
cues. Behavioural Brain Research, 266, 119–130. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.bbr.2014.03.004
Schouppe, N., De Houwer, J., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & Notebaert, W.
(2012). Conflict: Run! Reduced Stroop interference with avoidance
responses. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Ex-
perimental Psychology, 65, 1052–1058. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
17470218.2012.685080
Settles, R. E., Fischer, S., Cyders, M. A., Combs, J. L., Gunn, R. L., &
Smith, G. T. (2012). Negative urgency: A personality predictor of
externalizing behavior characterized by neuroticism, low conscientious-
ness, and disagreeableness. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 121, 160–
172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0024948
Shao, R., Read, J., Behrens, T. E., & Rogers, R. D. (2013). Shifts in
reinforcement signalling while playing slot-machines as a function of
prior experience and impulsivity. Translational Psychiatry, 3, e213.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/tp.2012.134
Smith, G., Levere, M., & Kurtzman, R. (2009). Poker player behavior after
big wins and big losses. Management Science, 55, 1547–1555. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1090.1044
Smith, P. L., & Ratcliff, R. (2004). Psychology and neurobiology of simple
decisions. Trends in Neurosciences, 27, 161–168. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1016/j.tins.2004.01.006
Steiner, A. P., & Redish, A. D. (2014). Behavioral and neurophysiological
correlates of regret in rat decision-making on a neuroeconomic task.
Nature Neuroscience, 17, 995–1002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn.3740
Stevens, T., Brevers, D., Chambers, C. D., Lavric, A., McLaren, I. P.,
Mertens, M., . . . Verbruggen, F. (2015). How does response inhibition
influence decision making when gambling? Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Applied, 21, 15–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xap0000039
Stewart, N., Reimers, S., & Harris, A. J. L. (2015). On the origin of utility,
weighting, and discounting functions: How they get their shapes and
how to change their shapes. Management Science, 61, 687–705. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1853
Stuphorn, V., & Emeric, E. E. (2012). Proactive and reactive control by the
medial frontal cortex. Frontiers in Neuroengineering, 5, 9. http://dx.doi
.org/10.3389/fneng.2012.00009
Taylor, S. F., Stern, E. R., & Gehring, W. J. (2007). Neural systems for
error monitoring: Recent findings and theoretical perspectives. The
Neuroscientist, 13, 160 –172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10738
58406298184
Trepel, C., Fox, C. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2005). Prospect theory on the
brain? Toward a cognitive neuroscience of decision under risk. Cogni-
162 VERBRUGGEN, CHAMBERS, LAWRENCE, AND MCLAREN
tive Brain Research, 23, 34–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogbrainres
.2005.01.016
Tymula, A., Rosenberg Belmaker, L. A., Roy, A. K., Ruderman, L.,
Manson, K., Glimcher, P. W., & Levy, I. (2012). Adolescents’ risk-
taking behavior is driven by tolerance to ambiguity. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 109,
17135–17140. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1207144109
Ullsperger, M., Danielmeier, C., & Jocham, G. (2014). Neurophysiology of
performance monitoring and adaptive behavior. Physiological Reviews,
94, 35–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/physrev.00041.2012
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B., & Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task switch-
ing: Interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychological
Bulletin, 136, 601–626. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0019791
van Holst, R. J., van den Brink, W., Veltman, D. J., & Goudriaan, A. E.
(2010). Brain imaging studies in pathological gambling. Current Psy-
chiatry Reports, 12, 418–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11920-010-
0141-7
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P. H., & Hommel, B. (2009). Reward
counteracts conflict adaptation. Evidence for a role of affect in executive
control. Psychological Science, 20, 1473–1477. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02470.x
Verbruggen, F., Adams, R., & Chambers, C. D. (2012). Proactive motor
control reduces monetary risk taking in gambling. Psychological Sci-
ence, 23, 805–815. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797611434538
Verbruggen, F., Best, M., Bowditch, W. A., Stevens, T., & McLaren,
I. P. L. (2014). The inhibitory control reflex. Neuropsychologia, 65,
263–278. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.08.014
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008). Response inhibition in the stop-
signal paradigm. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 418–424. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.005
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009a). Models of response inhibition in the
stop-signal and stop-change paradigms. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral
Reviews, 33, 647–661. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.08.014
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009b). Proactive adjustments of re-
sponse strategies in the stop-signal paradigm. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 35, 835–854. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0012726
Verbruggen, F., McLaren, I. P. L., & Chambers, C. D. (2014). Banishing
the control homunculi in studies of action control and behavior change.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 497–524. http://dx.doi.org/10
.1177/1745691614526414
Vlaev, I., Chater, N., Stewart, N., & Brown, G. D. A. (2011). Does the
brain calculate value? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15, 546–554. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.09.008
Wardle, H., Moody, A., Spence, S., Orford, J., Volberg, R., Jotangia, D., &
Dobbie, F. (2011). British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010. London,
United Kingdom: Stationery Office.
Wright, N. D., Morris, L. S., Guitart-Masip, M., & Dolan, R. J. (2013).
Manipulating the contribution of approach-avoidance to the perturbation
of economic choice by valence. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 7, 228.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2013.00228
Yeung, N., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural basis of
error detection: Conflict monitoring and the error-related negativity.
Psychological Review, 111, 931–959. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
295X.111.4.931
Appendix A
Combinations of Nongambling and Gambling Options
Overview of the different combinations of options in the experi-
ments (16 in total). Each combination occurred with equal probability.
Expected value  20:
• 100% certain to win 20 versus 66% certain to win 30
• 100% certain to win 20 versus 50% certain to win 40
• 100% certain to win 20 versus 33% certain to win 60
• 100% certain to win 20 versus 25% certain to win 80
Expected value  30:
• 100% certain to win 30 versus 66% certain to win 45
• 100% certain to win 30 versus 50% certain to win 60
• 100% certain to win 30 versus 33% certain to win 90
• 100% certain to win 30 versus 25% certain to win 120
Expected value  40:
• 100% certain to win 40 versus 66% certain to win 60
• 100% certain to win 40 versus 50% certain to win 80
• 100% certain to win 40 versus 33% certain to win 80
• 100% certain to win 40 versus 25% certain to win 160
Expected value  50:
• 100% certain to win 50 versus 66% certain to win 75
• 100% certain to win 50 versus 50% certain to win 100
• 100% certain to win 50 versus 33% certain to win 150




Overview of Univariate Analyses
Table B1
Overview of Univariate Analyses to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on the Start RT





error F p gen2
Experiment 1 2 38 337,735 179,253 35.798 .001 .153
Experiment 2 2 78 90,207 299,992 11.727 .001 .036
Experiment 3
Outcome Trial n–1 2 78 1,080,000 1,848,854 22.800 .001 .083
Casino alternation (CA) 1 39 63,800 1,298,828 1.910 .174 .005
Outcome by CA 2 78 18 1,212,027 .001 .999 .000
Experiment 4 2 78 132,183 237,340 21.720 .001 .044
Experiment 5 2 78 15,412 385,935 1.557 .217 .002
Note. In Experiment 3, we also included Casino Alternation as a within-subjects factor. RT  reaction time;
gen  generalized.
Table B2
Overview of Univariate Analyses to Explore the Effect of the Median Split (Rating: rating 
median vs. rating  median) and the Preceding Gambling Trial (Outcome: nongamble, gambled





error F p gen2
“Pleased with outcome”
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 66 275,878 746,990 12.188 .001 .050
Rating split 1 33 2,917 304,939 .316 .578 .001
Outcome:rating split 2 66 11,304 367,909 1.014 .368 .002
“Increased chances of winning”
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 66 259,152 725,899 11.781 .001 .048
Rating split 1 33 9,990 255,436 1.291 .264 .002
Outcome:rating split 2 66 11,494 369,234 1.027 .364 .002
Note. gen  generalized.
Table B3
Overview of Univariate Analyses to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on Performance





error F p gen2
Experiment 4
Start RT 2 78 433,299 417,553 40.471 .001 .101
Go accuracy 2 78 .004 .369 .467 .629 .006
Go RT 2 78 49,764 298,442 6.503 .002 .012
Experiment 5
Start RT 2 78 346,073 620,776 21.742 .001 .036
Go accuracy 2 78 .016 .144 4.233 .018 .027
Go RT 2 78 4,681 104,288 1.751 .180 .001
Note. gen  generalized; RT  reaction time.
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Appendix C
Probability of Gambling in Experiments 1–5
The combined analysis reported in the main manuscript indi-
cates that subjects gambled less after a gambled win than after a
nongamble, and that the probability of gambling was highest after
a gambled loss. The pgamble analyses for each individual experi-
ment revealed similar numerical differences (Table C1), but the
paired t tests were not always significant (Table C2). The univar-
iate analyses are presented in Table C3.
For Experiment 2, we also performed a median-split analysis (see
the main manuscript for further details). The results are presented in
Tables C4–C5. pgamble was generally lower for trials with a higher
“pleased with outcome” rating than for trials with a lower rating,
suggesting that the decision to gamble is influenced by hedonic state.
The “increased chances of winning” analysis revealed a significant
interaction between the outcome of the previous trial and the “in-
creased chance of winning” rating. After a loss, probability of gam-
bling was higher for high-rating trials than for low rating trials; this
difference was statistically significant, p  .008, and suggests a cog-
nitive influence on the probability of gambling. For trials following a
nongamble or a gambled win, the numerical pgamble differences between
low- and high-rating trials were not significant (both ps  .47).
Table C1
Overview of Probability of Gambling for Experiments 1–5 as a Function of the Outcome of the
Last Gambling Trial
Nongamble Loss Gambled win
Experiment M SD M SD M SD
Experiment 1 .517 .159 .529 .166 .452 .188
Experiment 2
No rating .511 .213 .517 .210 .444 .240
Rating .518 .226 .457 .212 .457 .231
Experiment 3
Casino repetition .443 .221 .505 .190 .409 .222
Casino alternation .439 .227 .505 .194 .427 .221
Experiment 4 .458 .204 .483 .186 .412 .192
Experiment 5 .492 .178 .521 .186 .462 .191
Note. In Experiment 2, we distinguished between rating and no-rating trials. In Experiment 3, we distinguished
between casino-repetition and casino-alternation trials. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects performed a nongam-
bling task between two successive gambling trials.
Table C2
Overview of Planned Comparisons to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on Probability of Gambling in Experiments 1–5
Experiment diff Lower CI Upper CI t p gav BF
Experiment 1
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .011 .084 .061 .325 .749 .068 .24
Nongamble vs. gambled win .065 .003 .128 2.187 .041 .368 1.61
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .076 .013 .14 2.52 .021 .423 2.79
Experiment 2: no rating
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .006 .066 .054 .210 .835 .029 .17
Nongamble vs. gambled win .067 .004 .129 2.168 .036 .292 1.39
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .073 .012 .134 2.418 .020 .322 2.23
Experiment 2: rating
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .061 .006 .115 2.265 .029 .275 1.66
Nongamble vs. gambled win .062 .010 .133 1.746 .089 .267 .68
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .001 .055 .057 .032 .975 .004 .17
Experiment 3
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .064 .115 .013 2.537 .015 .314 2.84
Nongamble vs. gambled win .023 .032 .079 .842 .405 .109 .24
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .087 .033 .141 3.244 .002 .448 13.96
Experiment 4
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .026 .072 .021 1.113 .272 .131 .30
Nongamble vs. gambled win .045 .002 .089 2.136 .039 .228 1.31
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .071 .022 .121 2.913 .006 .374 6.42
Experiment 5
Nongamble vs. gambled loss .029 .075 .017 1.257 .216 .156 .35
Nongamble vs. gambled win .030 .012 .073 1.444 .157 .162 .44
Gambled loss vs. gambled win .059 .015 .103 2.703 .010 .310 4.04




Overview of Univariate Analyses to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on pgamble on the





error F p gen2
Experiment 1 2 38 .068 .382 3.396 .044 .039
Experiment 2
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 78 .166 2.205 2.943 .059 .014
Rating 1 39 .011 .238 1.768 .191 .001
Outcome:rating 2 78 .065 .641 3.945 .023 .006
Experiment 3
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 78 .324 2.186 5.775 .005 .030
Casino alternation (CA) 1 39 .001 .525 .094 .761 .000
Outcome by CA 2 78 .006 .589 .370 .692 .001
Experiment 4 2 78 .104 .823 4.925 .010 .023
Experiment 5 2 78 .069 .745 3.630 .031 .017
Note. gen  generalized.
Table C4
Overview of the Probability of Gambling as a Function of the Median Split (Rating  Median




Statement Median Median Median Median Median Median
“I was pleased with the outcome
of the previous trial.” .59 (.21) .55 (.21) .51 (.22) .49 (.20) .54 (.22) .49 (.21)
“I think my chances of winning
on the next trial have
increased.” .56 (.22) .58 (.20) .47 (.21) .54 (.20) .53 (.21) .50 (.22)
Note. SD in parentheses.
Table C5
Overview of Univariate Analyses to Explore the Effect of the Median Split (Rating: rating 
median vs. rating  median) and the Preceding Gambling Trial (Outcome: nongamble, gambled





error F p gen2
“Pleased with outcome”
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 66 .175 2.674 2.164 .123 .019
Rating split 1 33 .061 .482 4.164 .049 .007
Outcome:rating split 2 66 .005 .964 .160 .853 .001
“Increased chances of winning”
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 66 .167 2.640 2.093 .131 .019
Rating split 1 33 .030 .561 1.740 .196 .003
Outcome:rating split 2 66 .087 .806 3.548 .034 .010
Note. gen  generalized.
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Appendix D
Choice Latencies in Experiments 1–5
Table D1
Overview of Choice Latencies for Experiments 1–5 as a Function of the Outcome of the Last
Gambling Trial
Nongamble Loss Gambled win
Experiment M SD M SD M SD
Experiment 1 687 135 672 134 706 150
Experiment 2
No rating 974 259 939 229 996 273
Rating 980 258 913 228 993 285
Experiment 3
Casino repetition 662 137 664 168 670 147
Casino alternation 653 123 654 148 678 160
Experiment 4 621 137 605 130 636 139
Experiment 5 612 185 603 178 626 198
Note. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects performed a nongambling task between two successive gambling trials.
Table D2
Overview of Planned Comparisons to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on Choice
Latencies in Experiments 1–5
Experiment diff Lower CI Upper CI t p gav BF
Experiment 1
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 15 7 37 1.434 .168 .108 .56
Nongamble vs. gambled win 19 53 14 1.209 .242 .132 .44
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 34 64 4 2.411 .026 .235 2.32
Experiment 2
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 50 18 83 3.115 .003 .209 10.26
Nongamble vs. gambled win 17 56 21 .922 .362 .067 .25
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 68 102 34 4.005 .001 .276 98.86
Experiment 3
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 1 28 25 .105 .917 .010 .17
Nongamble vs. gambled win 17 45 12 1.201 .237 .123 .33
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 16 36 5 1.498 .142 .104 .48
Experiment 4
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 16 0 33 2.031 .049 .121 1.08
Nongamble vs. gambled win 15 33 4 1.620 .113 .106 .56
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 31 54 8 2.775 .008 .230 4.72
Experiment 5
Nongamble vs. gambled loss 8 8 24 1.029 .310 .045 .28
Nongamble vs. gambled win 14 33 5 1.501 .141 .072 .48
Gambled loss vs. gambled win 22 43 1 2.148 .038 .117 1.34
Note. diff  difference; CI  confidence interval; gav  Hedge’s average g; BF  Bayes factor. Experiment
1, df  19; Experiments 2–5, df  39.
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Table D3
Overview of Univariate Analyses to Explore the Effect of the Previous Gamble on Choice





error F p gen2
Experiment 1 2 38 11,686 71,002 3.127 .055 .010
Experiment 2
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 78 199,349 947,225 8.208 .001 .013
Rating 1 39 3,474 351,239 .386 .538 .000
Outcome:rating 2 78 10,838 604,614 .699 .500 .001
Experiment 3
Outcome Trial n – 1 2 78 14,065 494,790 1.109 .335 .003
Casino alternation (CA) 1 39 920 110,577 .324 .572 .000
Outcome by CA 2 78 4,329 372,294 .454 .637 .001
Experiment 4 2 78 19,523 143,366 5.311 .007 .009
Experiment 5 2 78 6,740 161,370 1.629 .203 .002
Note. gen  generalized.
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